Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Richard Jeremy Mattinson : Reply
Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jennifer K. Gowans; Fillmore Spencer LLC; Counsel for Petitioner.
Matthew D. Bates; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Timothy L.
Taylor; Counsel for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Mattinson, No. 20050415 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5789

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20050415-SC
vs.
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON,
Defendant/Petitioner.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL'S JUDGMENT IN STATE V.
MATTINSON, CASE NO. 20030474-CA, THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.

Matthew Bates (9861)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666)
Attorney General
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Jennifer K. Gowans (7538)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

Attorneys for State of Utah

Attorneys for Richard J. Martinson
FILED

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION RECjOfctf^ELLATE COURTS

DEC 7 - 2 0 0 5

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20050415-SC
vs.
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON,
Defendant/Petitioner.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL'S JUDGMENT IN STATE V.
MATTINSON, CASE NO. 20030474-CA, THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.

Matthew Bates (9861)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
Attorney General
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Jennifer K. Gowans (7538)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

Attorneys for State of Utah

Attorneys for Richard J. Martinson

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

I.

2

THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN
A.

THE STATE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT §76-101801 SERVES A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT
INTEREST OR THAT IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO
ACHIEVE THAT END
2

B.

THE STATE IGNORES LAW THAT CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ARE RESERVED FOR HARMFUL
BEHAVIOR AND ASSERTS THAT HARMLESS SPEECH
MAY BE PROSECUTED
4

C.

THE STATE MISINTERPRETS BINDING FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHING THE
PROPER ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT
REGULATE SPEECH
10

CONCLUSION

12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 568 (1952)

9

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L.Ed. 2d 430, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969)

5, 10

Broadrickv. Okla., 413 U.S. 601 (1973)

11

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)

2-3

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)

8
5

Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)

10

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)

6-9

Goodingv. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)

4

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)
Lewis v. City ofNew Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990)

11
5
3-4, 5

Near v. Minesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931)

5

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

6-7, 9

Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)

5

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)

5

Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)

5,10

Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)

5

ii

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)

5

Constitutional Provisions
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, First Amendment

passim

Utah Code Annotated
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1801

passim

Other Sources
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963).. 7
Model Penal Code, ent. Draft No. 13,1961, §§250.7

iii

8

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20050415-SC
vs.
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON,
Defendant/Petitioner.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State has failed to meet its burden in this case. It has neither asserted a
compelling government interest Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 was designed to serve, nor
demonstrated that the statute is necessary to serve a compelling interest. The State also
does not argue that the communications fraud statute is narrowly tailored to meet any
compelling interest. Rather, the State admits the statute is broad and embraces the
unlimited prosecutorial discretion it bestows. However, the State could not meet these
burdens in any event, because the government has no compelling interest in proscribing
harmless conduct, and the plain language of the communications fraud statute reveals that
it is not narrowly drawn.
Nonetheless, the State urges this Court to take the unprecedented action of
applying the constitutional analysis for civil defamation to a criminal statute that

admittedly proscribes harmless non-defamatory speech. While relying on case law that is
inapposite to the facts here, the State selectively ignores established legal precedent that
provides the appropriate authoritative template for analyzing the constitutionality of a
criminal statute regulating speech, such as §76-10-1801. Accordingly, the State's
arguments areflawedand the communications fraud statute is invalid for facial
overbreadth.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN.
A.

THE STATE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT §76-10-1801
SERVES A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST OR
THAT IT IS NARROWLY DRAWN TO ACHIEVE THAT END.

As outlined in Martinson's opening brief, because the communications fraud
statute regulates speech, the State must meet the twofold burden of showing that (1) the
statute serves a compelling government interest, and (2) it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992). The State has not only ignored
both of these burdens, but has effectively conceded the point, as the following analysis
proves.
As the State concedes, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is not aimed only at fraud.
See, e.g., BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ("Br. Resp.") at 15. It proscribes any falsehood made
for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from another, regardless of whether the
communication is relied upon or even taken seriously, or if the desired result is harmless.

2

"To survive strict scrutiny . . . a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest
- it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest." Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. at 199. The State does not even assert that Utah Code Ann. §76-101801 serves a compelling government interest, much less demonstrate that it has one.
This omission is understandable but fatal to the State's position.
But what is affirmatively stated in the State's brief is even more fatal. Rather
than demonstrate that the statute is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, the State
effectively concedes there is not one:
"[Falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly are not protected,
whatever the object of the fraud. It is therefore irrelevant how the statute limits
the object of the fraud. Whether the object of the fraud is a kiss, a vote, avoiding
arrest, or some other thing of arguable value is irrelevant, because an intentional,
knowing, or reckless falsehood is not protected."
Br. Resp. at 15. The forgoing quotation speaks for itself. Herein the State concedes that
even harmless falsehoods, such as those discussed in Martinson's opening brief (BRIEF
OF APPELLANT at 17, 18,19, 22, 31, 32, 33) are proscribed by §76-10-1801. There is no
precedent for the State's claim that the government can proscribe and prosecute harmless
speech. There is certainly no compelling interest in doing so.
The State also does not address the "narrowly tailored" requirement, and again
concedes in the foregoing quotation that the communications fraud statute broadly
criminalizes all falsehoods regardless of the value sought. The State's argument that such
overbreadth is acceptable is incorrect. "Even if a statute . . . aims at penalizing an

3

unprotected class of speech, it 'must be carefully drawn to be authoritatively construed to
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
expression.'" Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372,1375 (Utah App. 1990) (citing
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)).
Because the State has not refuted but has rather embraced the unlimited
discretion bestowed by the broad provisions of §76-10-1801, there is no need for
Martinson to reargue here that the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve any
legitimate government interest.
In short, the State has failed to meet its burdens, effectively conceding that the
communications fraud statute serves no compelling government interest and that the
statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Therefore, this Court
should reject the State's arguments and find that §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad.
B.

THE STATE IGNORES LAW THAT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ARE RESERVED FOR HARMFUL BEHAVIOR AND ASSERTS
THAT HARMLESS SPEECH MAY BE PROSECUTED.

The State is asking this Court to create an unprecedented standard in First
Amendment jurisprudence. As previously shown, the State concedes that §76-10-1801
proscribes harmless falsehoods, but then argues that it can.1 This argument ignores and
contradicts binding case law cited throughout Mattinson's opening brief demonstrating

'"Whether the object of thefraudis a kiss, a vote, avoiding arrest, or some other
thing of arguable value is irrelevant, because an intentional, knowing, or reckless
falsehood is not protected." Br. Resp. At 15.
4

not only that criminal statutes regulating speech must be narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling government interest, but they must also be justified by the existence of some
imminent harm the state seeks to prevent.2 These principles cannot be simply ignored as
the State suggests. Otherwise, the danger exists that an "expansive, content-based
[statute] restricting speech [will be] invoked only where there is no other valid basis for
arresting an objectionable or suspicious person[, such as occurred in this case]. The
opportunity for abuse . . . is self-evident." Logan City v. Ruber, 786 P.2d at 1376
(quoting Lewis v. City ofNew Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Thus, in the context of a criminal statute, a compelling interest equates to the prevention
of some imminent harm.
The State does not claim that it seeks to prevent any imminent harm; it simply
argues that it can prosecute any falsehood made with the requisite intent. The State
makes this "I do, because I can" argument because it cannot refute the anomaly that even
harmless speech is subject to criminal sanctions under the overly broad provisions of §7610-1801. Therefore, the State concedes the falsehood, "You don't look fat in that dress"
is subject to the whims of prosecutorial discretion whether the value sought from another
is a kiss (a second degree felony) or the price of a dress (likely a class B misdemeanor).

2

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass %
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenckv.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5

As previously shown, criminal statutes regulating speech must be narrowly
tailored to address an imminent harm or a compelling interest. The State does not
acknowledge or address this long-standing principle or any of the authoritative precedent
Martinson cites in his opening brief, which is the template that must be applied in
analyzing the constitutionality of any criminal statute that regulates speech, such as §7610-1801. This omission is again fatal to the State's position because no meaningful
analysis can occur with the very precedent establishing the parameters for criminal
statutes regulating speech excluded from the discussion.
The State inaccurately claims Garrison v. Louisiana3 supports the unprecedented
application of the civil defamation standard established in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan4 to a criminal statute regulating non-defamatory speech. Br. Resp. at 12-14.
Garrison is inapposite to the facts of this case and makes no such claim.
Garrison stands for the narrow proposition that any statute regulating
defamatory speech of public officials should be scrutinized under the standard established
in Sullivan. Garrison does not hold that all criminal statutes regulating speech should be
measured by the Sullivan standard.5 The State's selective citations from Garrison must

3

379U.S.64(1964).

4

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

5

If Garrison did support the State's position, it would have overruled all of the
precedent on point cited in Mattinson's brief, and more. However, none of that precedent
has been overruled by Garrison.
6

be examined in their true context, which the State has not provided.
The true context of Garrison is not only illuminating, but in reality, supports
Martinson's position. The issue in that case was whether, in view of the different
histories and purposes of criminal and civil libel statutes, Sullivan's civil defamation
standard also limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of public
officials. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 67. The Supreme Court held that Sullivan
limits state power to regulate defamatory speech involving public officials in any context.
Id. at 68 (overturning Louisiana's criminal libel statute because it violated the First
Amendment and criminalized protected speech).
Unlike Garrison, the communications fraud statute is not limited to speech
critical of public officials. This case also does not subject a criminal libel statute, such as
that at issue in Garrison, to constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, Garrison does not apply
here, at least not for the purpose the State intends.
However, the fundamental First Amendment principles outlined in Garrison not
only do apply here, but they end the debate, particularly regarding the imminence of harm
as an unequivocal requirement for any criminal statute regulating speech to survive
constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated:
"Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel prosecutions
lend support to the observation that'... under modem conditions, when the rule
of law is generally accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, it can
hardly be urged that the maintenance of peace requires a criminal prosecution for
private defamation.' Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 924 (1963). The absence in the Proposed
7

Official Draft of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute of any
criminal libel statute on the Louisiana pattern reflects this modern consensus.
The ALI Reporters, in explaining the omission, gave cogent evidence of the
obsolescence of Livingston's justification:
'"It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely by
the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways that
entitle him to maintain a civil suit. Usually we reserve the criminal law
for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community's sense
ofsecurity. . .. It seems evident that personal calumny falls in neither of
these classes in the U. S. A., that it is therefore inappropriate for penal
control, and that this probably accounts for the paucity of prosecutions
and the near desuetude of private criminal libel legislation in this country.
. . . ' Model Penal Code, ent. Draft No. 13, 1961, §§ 250.7, Comments, at
44."
Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
Thus, under Garrison, even the indisputable harm of defamation is not deemed
of such pernicious character that criminal sanctions are justified. Yet ironically, the State
in this case relies upon Garrison to support its claim that criminal liability should be
imposed even for harmless conduct. This claim is obviously not supported by Garrison.
In holding the Louisiana criminal libel statute in Garrison unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court specifically focused on the fact that the statute created criminal liability
without harm, or breach of the peace, and further criticized the Louisiana court's rejection
of the "clear and present danger" test, noting this rejection was also indicative that the
statute was not narrowly drawn.6

6

"The Reporters therefore recommended only narrowly drawn statutes designed to
reach words tending to cause a breach of the peace, such as the statute sustained in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, or designed to reach speech, such as group
8

Therefore, the sole case that the State presents as supporting authority for its
novel claim that the First Amendment does not protect harmless speech contradicts the
State's own position. Garrison is expressly limited to the context of speech critical of
public officials, and in fact repeatedly refers to the standard set forth in Sullivan as the
"public official rule."7 Indeed, Garrison explicitly rejects the State's arguments.
Garrison not only requires that a criminal statute regulating speech be directed to
imminent harm, but it neither imposes the New York Times v. Sullivan standard upon

vilification, 'especially likely to lead to public disorders,' such as the statute sustained in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. But Louisiana's rejection of the clear-and-presentdanger standard as irrelevant to the application of its statute,... coupled with the absence
of any limitation in the statute itself to speech calculated to cause breaches of the peace,
leads us to conclude that the Louisiana statute is not this sort of narrowly drawn statute."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 70 (some citations omitted).
7

"We recognize that different interests may be involved where purely private libels,
totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; therefore, nothing we say today is to be
taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitutional guarantees in the
discrete area of purely private libels." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 73, n. 8.
"Wefindno difficulty in bringing the appellant's statement within the purview of
criticism of the official conduct of public officials, entitled to the benefit of the New York
Times rule." Id. at 76.
"The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an
official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The publicofficial rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the
people concerning public officials, their servants." Id. at 76-77.
"Applying the principles of the New York Times case, we hold that the Louisiana
statute, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, incorporates
constitutionally invalid standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of
public officials." Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
9

criminal statutes regulating non-defamatory speech nor rejects the "clear and present
danger" doctrine. Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's arguments and find
that §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad.
C.

THE STATE MISINTERPRETS BINDING FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHING THE PROPER ANALYSIS
FOR CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT REGULATE SPEECH.

The State claims the Martinson's reliance on Schenck v. United States8 and its
progeny is misplaced. Br. Resp. at 15. However, the State provides no thoughtful
analysis demonstrating how it reached this conclusion.9 The State cites Brandenburg v.
Ohio10 for the idea that the incitement test "only applies to laws that forbid the advocacy
of violence or the violation of the law." Br. Resp. at 16. None of the cases cited by the
State so hold. Therefore, the State's conclusion is wrong. However, because Schenck
and its progeny summarily defeat the State's arguments, the State's only recourse is to
8

249U.S.47(1919).

9

The State cites a concurring opinion from Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), which cites Schenck as authoritative
precedent. Moreover, while mildly criticizing Schenck for not providing enough
protection for speech protected under the First Amendment, the Court stated in its main
opinion, "The history of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, however, is one of
continual development, as the Constitution's general command that 'Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,' has been applied to new
circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior principles and precedents. The
essence of that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases of
extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not elsewhere
required." Id. at 740. The State further cites a footnote from a 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, which cites Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
,0

395 U.S. 444 (1969).
10

wrongly argue they don't apply.
While it is certainly true that legal principles are fluid and continually evolving
to fit times and circumstances, none of the cases Martinson cites in his opening brief
relative to the correct First Amendment analysis to be applied in the context of a criminal
statute has been overruled. See, fn. 2, supra. The principles behind the "clear and present
danger" test remain constant. "Properly applied, the test requires a court to make its own
inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular
utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the
need for free and unfettered expression." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 842-843 (1978).
The State has failed to address the voluminous case law articulating the
fundamental principles that must be considered when analyzing any statute that seeks to
regulate speech, including without limitation the principle that "the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to
fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes." Broadrick v.
OMa.9 413 U.S. 601, 612-613 (1973).
Therefore, rather than analyze §76-10-1801 under the appropriate First
Amendment standard, the State disingenuously concludes from dicta taken out of context
that the standard does not apply. Thus, the State circumvents legal principles established
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by First Amendment jurisprudence while urging this Court to hold that the State may
prosecute any falsehood, harmless or otherwise, whether the value sought is a kiss, the
sale of a dress, or the assurance that a critically ill friend will obtain proper medical
treatment. Because the State refuses to apply the appropriate standard developed by a
long line of First Amendment jurisprudence, the State's arguments are flawed and lack
the proper constitutional framework necessary for cogent analysis. However, if the State
did apply the appropriate standard in its analysis, it would be forced to concede the issue.
The communications fraud statute's facial overbreadth is manifest both by its
plain language and under the controlling law on point. Therefore, the statute should be
deemed overbroad on its face and this case should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner, Richard Jeremy Martinson, respectfully requests this Court to find
that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is facially overbroad, and to thereby vacate his
conviction.

Respectfully submitted this ( j ^ day of December, 2005.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
c

^

Jennifibr K. (rowans
Attorneys for Defendant
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